Serhiy Choliy, War as a Model of Population Movement in the Modern World: the Galician Perspectives in the First World War

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Serhiy Choliy

War as a Model of Population Movement in the Modern World: the Galician Perspectives in the First World War

 

The results of European modernization during the 19th century, especially in the military sphere, had wide-ranging political consequences for the organization of population movement during the First World War. The example of the contested borderland territory of Galicia demonstrates the similarity of approaches by two rival imperial structures – Habsburg and Romanov – to the problem of people resource management during wartime. This article examines the goals and actions of Austria-Hungary and Russia in this sphere, and demonstrates new approaches to mass displacements as an important and sometimes crucial technique, which first appeared during World War I.
Disparities in economic development in Europe during the second half of 19th century resulted in the creation of peripheral and semi-colonial territories. Some of them were independent, like the newborn Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania), but some formed peripheries inside developed imperial structures. One of the best examples of the latter in the European context are the provinces of Galicia and Bosnia in the Habsburg Empire. For independent states the status of periphery often lead to loss of influence in international policy and following decline, mostly connected with domination of leading countries in economy and unfair methods of concurrence on international level. Such a situation was a reason for another important developmental trend: attempts of modernization for peripheral countries, aimed to “overtake” leading countries (Nota 1). The peripheries inside the independent states were a result of their economic processes and unbalanced development of some territories at the expense of others (Nota 2). In such a case the aim of modernization attempts was not to diminish the periphery, but to use its resources more effectively, not changing the existing economic balance in the state. Thus, peripheries received modernization and the use of new technologies only in crucial areas, important for state subsistence, like military. An important modernization component in 19th century Europe was compulsory military service, which by the eve of the First World War was introduced in almost every European country, including peripheries.  European conscription was the first step for full-scale involvement of the population in military affairs, that later resulted in population movement actions. For the Russian Empire, aggressive foreign policy and military actions were also planned as a way of solving political problems at the expense of defeated countries, especially Austria-Hungary (Nota 3).
By 1914 every country in Europe was preparing for war, which was the first war that concentrated mass armies of over one million soldiers. Mobilization plans for the first days of possible war included even more actions in the civil sphere than in the military (Nota 4). One of the most important features of WWI warfare was the creation of mass armies, manned on the basis of universal conscription. This was the direct result of military modernizations of the mid-19th century. Massive warfare with millions of people in the field resulted in the growth of consumption followed by shortages in all spheres; manning system and systems for the distribution of goods became ineffective. WWI was the first war, where population became the most important resource, sometimes more necessary than firearms or artillery shells (Nota 5). 
As a response, the period of European Modernity demonstrated rapid changes of state government techniques and inventions for the effective organization of defense, with a strong emphasis on population movement. 

 

Historical Background

On the eve of WWI the territory of Galicia was part of the Austrian half of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian Empire, ruled by representatives of the Habsburg dynasty. It was united in a separate administrative unit, called “The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria”. From an economic perspective Galicia was a peripheral territory of Austria-Hungary. There was economic progress only in several branches of industry, for example in petroleum production. The Galician population was mostly peasants, traditionally employed in agriculture. This region was one of the poorest in the Habsburg lands (Nota 6).
Galicia was inhabited by several major national and confessional groups, each having different national interests and foreign policy orientations. The diversity of Galician national life influenced the creation of a unique local microcosm of interethnic relations and cohabitation of the three most important national groups: Jews, Poles and Ukrainians (Ruthenes). Each was represented by different political parties and platforms with clear domination of Poles in political life of the province (Nota 7).
Disparities in governmental structure and Ukrainian national movement resulted in further development of Polish-Ukrainian national conflict in political, confessional, economic and other spheres. Some bloody incidents took place. Despite the fact, that by 1914 both parties came to an understanding known as the Galician Compromise (Ausgleich), mutual distrust was rising. Both Poles and Ukrainians had maximalist and extremist directions in their political environment wanting to reach their goals at the expense of other national groups (Nota 8).
On the eve of WWI, Austria-Hungary and Russia’s vision of a future world order and state frontiers included Galicia as a borderland and zone of interest, putting the two empires in conflict.
The situation in Galicia was more-or-less satisfactory for the Habsburgs. Austria-Hungary was united by a complicated system of counterbalances in each province and throughout the Empire as a whole. Franz Josef I tried to keep his Empire a viable union of different nations, often taking advantage of their antipathy, mutually beneficial economic ties and creating strong interdependency. The greatest problem of this system during the first decades of 20th century was the rise of nationalism and escalation of national conflicts in several provinces. Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia was not the biggest problem of Habsburgs, but in the case of war each nation could hinder the territorial unity of the Austro-Hungarian state.
For the Romanov Empire the war could become a means to solve important internal problems. After the loss of the Russian-Japanese war in 1905 and Revolution of 1905-1907, the country was ruled by a reactionary absolutist system. Rejecting any democratization, the state of Nicolas II was united by a strong autocratic power, based on violence and assimilation. Using Pan-Slavic rhetoric, the Russian Empire was directed to territorial unification of all Slavic nations under the rule of the Russian tsar. Long before 1914, a massive campaign of solidarity with “Russian brothers” abroad had begun. Galician Ukrainians, who were recognized as a part of the Russian nation, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, the same as South Slavs were the targets of Russian propaganda and foreign policy (Nota 9). In general, Russia was not interested in the territorial integrity of the Habsburg state, supporting local autonomists and separatists. In Galicia Russian authorities and intelligence service had strong contacts both in Polish and Ukrainian political milieu (Nota 10).
Thereby, on the eve of WWI the territory of Galicia was in the zone of intersection of two major powers of the region: Austria-Hungary and Russia. Both had significant internal problems and tried to solve these issues through different means. Austria-Hungary tried to maintain a status quo and had no interest in any foreign conflicts, while Russia tried to solve its internal problems with foreign acquisitions. In the case of Galicia both regimes were oriented toward some part of local national groups. On the other hand, the foreign policy orientation of these groups was often recognized as a threat to national security by both rival states.

 

Mobilization: everything for the front

Starting from 1868 the armed forces of Austria-Hungary were manned on the basis of universal conscription. During the 1870s the Habsburg State created a full-fledged mobilization system. In case of war its actions included regulations for population movements in three main areas: mobilization of men to the army, internment of suspected persons and transportation of refugees. Austria-Hungary hadn’t taken part in any major military conflict from 1860s up to 1914, but its mobilization system had been upgrading permanently. The border territory of Galicia included stricter regulations connected with its vulnerability in case of Russian assault. In case of war, Galicia’s population of eight million people would be utilized for war purposes.
WWI was the first opportunity for most European countries to test conscription in a real-life environment; any test or part-time mobilization could not compare with the general mobilization of 1914. On the eve of WWI Austria-Hungary still was facing several problems: lack of funds to arrange full-scale execution of military law and rise of nationalism, which partly paralyzed the legislative activity in the Empire. The situation with increase of military funding is representative in this context. Several national groups, especially Czechs, used the tactic of obstruction in the parliament and blocked the decision-making process in this field until their national demands were taken into account. Often only personal interventions of the Emperor Franz Joseph I was effective enough to raise the funding level for the army (Nota 11).
As an example, in 1881, 842,000 citizens were liable for military service but only 102,000 were enlisted and fulfilled their service in the army while 594,000 people received draft deferments or were recognized as physically unfit. A certain number of the liable either evaded or emigrated. This situation repeated from year to year, and in actuality only one eighth to one tenth of the male population served in the army.  This lack of military man power was a serious threat to the Austro-Hungarian defense system. In addition, not everyone who was enlisted served for the three years in so-called Common Army with full-scale drill.  Several categories of enlisted men served for only one or two years, the same as territorial defense soldiers, which were called for exercises for short periods of time  (Nota 12). During the first days of the war a large portions of the population had to be newly trained for military purposes.
By 1916 the Austrian army, due to lack of human resources, established  a special governing body – Supplies Chief or Chef des Ersatzwesens für die Gesammte Bewaffnete Macht (CHdE) – which in 1917-1918 was managed by Baron von Hazai. His main goal was the development of more effective system of resource usage in all spheres of life in Austria-Hungary (Nota 13). In 1916, it was estimated that 7.8 million people could be used as soldiers for Austria-Hungary, great number of people for a country with a population 52 million. It is worth emphasizing, that the male population of Austria-Hungary numbered 25.8 million, with 10.3 million men in an age range between 17-45 years.
As of January, 1, 1916, the general loss for the Austro-Hungarian army was estimated to be not less than 4 million people. With a monthly purpose of 84 thousand men, the Austrian general staff predicted exhaustion of all available human resources by October 1916  (Nota 14). Only the active processes of human resources redistribution, like high level of involvement of semi-fit people to the military service, new phase of mobilization, the same as following the return of prisoners of war (POWs) stabilized the situation. By the end of the war general number of mobilized was estimated as 9 million (Nota 15).
According to Polish researcher Maciej Krotofil, during the war the territory of Galicia and Bukovina got 1,383,789 people mobilized to the Austrian army. In general, it was not less than 15.7% of the civil population (1910). According to the 1910 census, sexual differentiation on these territories was almost equal: 50% were males and 50% females. Thereafter, not less than 30% of male population was mobilized, notably almost every man in their productive years (age 15-49). An average of 16.6 per thousand of the pre-war population (about 150 thousand) died during warfare (Nota 16).

  

Mobilization: to preserve law and order 

The second largest group of displacement actions, taken during the war by Viennese authorities, was connected with civil mobilization actions. Mobilization was a complex process, which required well-coordinated functioning of different governing bodies. In such circumstances any kind of social unrest was banned and strictly punished. According to mobilization instructions, any action had to be held under the supremacy of law. State governing bodies had to control different spheres of civil life and not to allow any drastic changes in their normal functioning. As an example, the government preserved the banking system, secured private property, and protected civil rights of every citizen etc (Nota 17). At the same time, each civil governing body was essentially obliged to help military authorities to mobilize as quick, as possible. This position a priori contradicted with protection of civil rights and often disproved the latter.
Mobilization instructions included Exceptional Means (Ausnahmsverfügung), which were the aims, directed to fast and unproblematic mobilization: censorship, surveillance, arrests, displacement, internment and limitation of free movement. Nine districts were created for actions on the territory of Austria Hungary, which were situated on the borders with suspected enemies – Russia, Italy and Serbia (Nota 18).
The Exceptional Means were introduced during the first weeks of war in Galicia to a maximal degree. The local Russophile population and pro-Russian propaganda were important arguments for such decision of the Viennese authorities. Repressions, directed to local population, mostly of Ukrainian origin, received the title “Ukrainian Betrayal” (“Ukrainischer Verrat”). Russophiles were suspected of being spies. Such mistrust soon was transferred to all the Ukrainians in the Habsburg monarchy, which were often recognized as a population, hostile to Habsburg rule. For the first weeks of war any kind of activities of Russophiles in Galicia were banned in very strict forms.  At the same time the Austrian army, using military law, sentenced to death and executed many persons, often for their Russian-like language. The resulting massive hysteria and suspicion encouraged a great part of the local Galician population to welcome the Russian army. According to the post-war studies, 546 people from Galicia and 46 from Bukovina, mostly Greek-Catholic or Orthodox Ukrainians, were sentenced to death as suspected traitors (Nota 19).
One of the most important aspects of Exceptional Means in Galicia was the mass internment. In world history, this was one of the first cases of internments on such a massive scale, with relocation and settlement in specially constructed camps. People, who were not sentenced to death, but were suspected of sympathizing with Russia, were not left behind the frontline. The success of the Russian army and its rapid occupation of Galicia provoked the avalanche of arrests, actions which were often the result of personal antipathy or false denunciation. The arrested were displaced and resettled by trains to specially constructed prison camps, the largest being Thalerhof, Spielberg (Styria), and Theresienstadt (Bohemia).  Some interned persons were kept in smaller camps, located in Austria and Hungary (Nota 20).
Thalerhof internment camp is infamous as one of the first concentration camps in world history. The same as other camps of this type it had several specific features, such as a high mortality rate, unbearable living conditions, the outrage of local administrations and complete neglect of prisoner’s civil rights. The core of those imprisoned in Thalerhof was a group of 867 Russophile clergymen from Galicia who were at first just left in the field without proper living conditions. Later, when the first barracks were constructed, most of the interned were left without any means of subsistence and support or medical treatment by local civil and military administration. As an example, the only remedy which was used to fight infectious deceases there was quarantine.
It is difficult to calculate the general number of Galician population, interned by Austrians during WWI but historians estimate the number ranges from 10 to 60 thousand people, with the second figure being more accurate. It is worth emphasizing that during that period the high mortality of the interned wasn’t the goal of creating the camps; it was connected with lack of experience in the field of organization and supply problems during wartime. Most of casualties in the camps were caused by infectious diseases. War hysteria and recognition of the interned people as “traitors” and “enemies” were important factors which also led to high mortality in camps like Thalerhof, because the local communities had a negative or indifferent attitude to interned people. Thalerhof and the other such camps in Austria-Hungary existed until July 2, 1917, after which Emperor Karl I abandoned them (Nota 21). 
The third form of Austrian state policy of displacement during WWI was the organized resettlement of refugees. For the first days of the war passport holders from Austria-Hungary who were abroad, as well as citizens who wished to resettle far from the frontline with Russia, had to move by three established evacuation lines: Bolen-Michalowice-Krakow for Western, Tarnogrod-Maidan Senyavski-Jaroslaw for Central and Volochysk-Pidvolochysk-Tarnopol for Eastern Galicia. These citizens had to be vetted by local administration then resettled or interned. Great number of Galician Jewry chose to become refugees to avoid possible repressions by the Russian occupational administration, which seemed to be anti-Semitic (Nota 22).
During autumn 1914 Galician refugees were placed in specially constructed camps in Carinthia, Bohemia, Moravia, Upper and Lower Austria, as well as in Vienna. The displacement of refugees was fulfilled by the same principle as internment, but was much better organized and included less violence toward the population (Nota 23). By the middle of 1915 up to 400 thousand refugees from Galicia had been displaced to the West. In general, by the end of the war the number of persons, who voluntarily or forcibly changed their residence from Eastern to the inner provinces of Austria-Hungary, numbered approximately 1.1 million (Nota 24).
The Austrian internal policy during the first year of WWI could be decrypted as a policy of double standards. The population of the Habsburg state, which had equal constitutional rights, was divided by war in two categories: loyal and suspected in disloyalty. The first category remained in the legal framework, while suspects were deprived of their rights. Thus, identical policy of displacement worked for each of these categories in quite a different way.

  

The World War goes on: the Russian occupation of Galicia

Armed conflict began in Galicia on August 23, 1914.  After first success in military operations, the Austro-Hungarian army retreated. The Russian military superiority on the Eastern front during the first week of the war broke Austrian defense line and was stopped only by a natural barrier – the Carpathian Mountains. On September 3, the Russian Army entered the capital of Galicia – Lemberg (L’viv). By September 16, they occupied almost all of Galicia and Bukovina, blocked the Austrian fortress Przemysl, and entered the territory of Hungary. The war on the Eastern front turned to the trench warfare until May, 1915, when the Austro-Hungarian army regained back most of the territory of Galicia. (Nota 25)

  

Pacification: administration and security

The new Russian administration immediately began a policy of integrating Galicia into the Russian Empire.  On August 25, 1914, the territory of Galicia and Bukovina received the title “The Military General-Governorship of Galicia” with count Georgij Bobrinski as its direct administrator. The territory of governorship was divided into four provinces: Lemberg, Tarnopol, Czernowitz and Przemysl. Due to military operations, the territory of the latter two changed (Nota 26). Russians stimulated immigration of administrative staff to Galicia from Russia. With their policies in the occupied territories, the Russians appeared uncompromising and interfered in the domestic affairs of the province. Count Bobrinski and archbishop Evlogiy began dismantling local educational systems, launched campaigns of forced assimilation (“Russification”), interrupted into confessional relations and forcibly converting local Greek-catholic to Russian Orthodoxy. Such policy provoked rising dissatisfaction with local administrations even among those, who welcomed Russians during the summer 1914 (Nota 27).
Determined to control the local population, the Russian administration introduced several regulations (Rasporyazheniya) regarding foreigners whereby citizens of Austria-Hungary and Germany, later of Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, had to be interned and resettled to a place of internal exile (Nota 28). Such regulations were also valid for Russian citizens of non-Slavic nationalities, especially ethnic Germans and Jews. After the start of warfare on the Austro-Hungarian-Russian border, this fate would also fall to citizens of the former who were on trips in Russia. Some lucky individuals left the territory of Russia and evaded internment, as did Ukrainian activist Vasyl Makovskiy, who crossed the border by smuggler’s assistance (Nota 29). After the occupation, Rasporyazheniya regulations were extended to newly acquired territories where reserve soldiers, officers and those fit for military service, had to be interned and resettled from Galicia or Bukovina. These policies were similar to the other European states during this time period (Nota 30).
People suspected of supporting Habsburg rule formed the second largest group of those interned from Galicia in Russia (Nota 31). These suspects were considered enemies of Russia, especially local political leaders and activists who were members of Ukrainophile parties, and were removed from the General-governorship to the inner provinces of Russia. According to reports of the occupational administration, 1,962 people were evicted from the territory of Galicia and 2,364 were resettled closer to the Russian border during the 11 months of the Russian occupation. Jews were not numbered in this statistics because they were recognized as a hostile population and were evacuated either from Galicia or from the frontline. General number of evacuated Jews was approximately 10,000 people. Those officials of Austrian bureaucratic staff who stayed in Galicia after the occupation also were recognized as suspects. Due to temporary problems with employment of Russian citizens in occupational apparatus, local officials were allowed to work on their former positions under Russian surveillance (Nota 32).
The local population was also obliged to provide hostages. The Russians deported hostages and used them to guarantee public tranquility in Galicia and as a safety factor for their military operations and troops. According to reports of the occupational administration, the general number of hostages was almost 700 people. Unfortunate, there is no opportunity to check the general sum of hostages because there was no organized system of their arrest, but information about their dislocation during the war indicates their much higher quantity. Very often local administration of the lowest level deported undesirables in form of hostages or interned without any registration of these actions. Russians made sometimes no difference between categories of interned or resettled in their reports. That is the main reason why the sum of 700 people seems to be unrealistic. However, the actual number of hostages from Galicia seems to be twice or even thrice more.
Following data from different sources demonstrates a lack of any system in hostage registration and bribery as an important factor to avoid internment. During the first days of Russian occupation, there was a request to provide 250 hostages from capital city of Galicia – Lemberg. As a result of following negotiations and direct corruption, this number decreased to 150. Later the real number of hostages taken from Lemberg was only 37 people – 15 Jews, 12 Poles and 10 Ukrainians (Nota 33). Russian authorities displaced them to different cities of Russia. Poles and Ukrainians were settled in Kyiv, where no one took care of them and they were starving without any means. According to memoirs and archival sources, there were 128 Galician hostages of Polish nationality in Kyiv and 554 Galician hostages of unidentified nationality in Poltava. Jewish hostages were settled in Nizhniy Novgorod, much farther from the frontline, and there are no exact data about their number. In contrary to official reports, the memories of local population indicate that the quantity of hostages was significant, especially among the Jewish population (Nota 34). Local leaders including the highest representatives of local clergy, such as metropolitan Andrzej Sheptycki, was deported to Siberia, and only the Russian revolution in 1917 allowed displaced persons to return home (Nota 35).

  

Painful retreat: evacuation and political aims

The political agenda of Russians and their political aims often run counter to the needs of military operations and occupational administration of Galicia. Harsh actions, aimed to create the security system, were reduced for national groups, which seemed to be the allies of Russians. Obligatory internment conditions for Austro-Hungarian reservists were cancelled for several national groups: Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Serbs and later for Italians and Romanians also (Nota 36). During the first months of the war Russian military command organized the campaign of release of Austro-Hungarian POWs. POWs, which came from occupied Galician territory and showed no hatred of the enemy, could be set free. They just had to give the parole of honor and sign the document that they refuse to act against the Russian tsar and state (Nota 37). In general some 4,300 registered POWs were set free (Nota 38).
Russian claims to the territory of Galicia were uninterrupted until May 1915. Since then this territory had changed its jurisdiction several times. In May 1915 the united armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany launched offensive in the Galician town of Gorlice and regained the territory of Galicia except its Eastern part with Tarnopol city which had been evacuated by the Russian administration. The Russians returned to Eastern Galicia in the summer 1916 as a result of the so-called Brusilov Offensive, but they occupied only a small part of their previous possession, with regional centers like Delyatyn, Stanislau, Halytsch. In June 1917, the Kerensky offensive was launched by Russians, but its temporary success ended in July 1917 when the Austro-Hungarian army regained Galicia and even occupied several districts of Russian Podolia.
During its retreat Russian authorities tried to secure the supporting population, which it recognized as a part of Russian state (Nota 39). Russian strategists wished to limit Austro-Hungarian resources for a following war and destroyed everything that could be used for war purposes. Thereafter, displacement action on a great scale consisted of voluntarily and forced displacement. Those afraid of returning to Austrian authorities, pro-Russian activists, and anyone who had no wish to take part in the war, became refugees and were evacuated to Kyiv and then Rostov, or placed in the neighboring Russian provinces of Podolia or Bessarabia (Nota 40).
Forced displacement was directed to limit the possible human resources of Austria-Hungary (Nota 41). There was an unrealistic project of total displacement of Galician Ukrainian population to the territory of Caucasus and creation of national autonomy there on the basis of traditional Ukrainian Cossack mechanism of government (Nota 42). In early 1915 local authorities of Galicia received an order to register all men, ages 18-50, which could be used for military service. After military clashes of May 1915, local authorities had to displace all such men, the same as cattle and stocks of material assets from Galician territory as fast, as it was possible. For this purpose there were special trains, which departed from Lemberg train station each evening. Evicted persons had to be settled in neighboring Volhynia. Only the swiftness of the offensive of Central Powers and disorganization at the Russian home front failed the realization of this project (Nota 43). Therefore, it is equally difficult to count, how many families were resettled. Russian author Alexandra Bahturina estimates that 18 thousand people were evacuated during May 1915. According to the reports of the occupational administration, during the first 6 days of June, 1915, more than 11,000 families received permits to resettle (some 50-55 thousand people). There are no exact data in this field, but it does indicate the scale of this operation. In their reports Russian authorities indicate “tens of thousands” were displaced. During May-June 1915 not less than 75,000 people were displaced from Galicia by Russian authorities. The general number of refugees and displaced from Galicia to Russia was estimated at 200,000 (Nota 44).
Displaced populations soon became a difficult humanitarian problem for the Russian administration for the following years. After the overthrow of the tsarist government and the following revolutions, new administrations and leaders had to deal with the problems of displaced persons. The situation was so problematic, that in 1916 many Galician refugees had to be returned from Russia to that part of Galicia, which still was under Russian occupation. Several hundred displaced inhabitants of Galicia even took part in the following civil war in Russia (Nota 45). Due to national conflicts and civil wars, the process of return of refugees and the displaced lasted until 1923 (Nota 46).
 Russian reign in Galicia demonstrated that their state-organized population policies were similar to those enacted by the Austrians. Russia acted on its neighbors’ territory as it did on its own, using the subject population for its own needs or displacing them to diminish enemy military potential. Simultaneously it was burdened by thousands of refugees from Galicia, who were recognized as aliens. The part of the enemy’s subject population, thus, was transferred to the position of ally and had to be secured by resettlement.
The General-Government of Galicia had ruled until March 16, 1916 and then its authority was transferred to Russian military command. Following Russian retreat Austria-Hungary returned to its jurisdiction over the major territory of Galicia, and from mid 1917 – became an occupant by itself, capturing more and more of Russian’s territories. The territory of Galicia was destroyed by war, but it never stopped the Austrian administration of continued mobilization there to fulfill its war losses from the local male population. The activities of the Habsburg administration were oriented to following much more effective use of human resources, which was crucial for their war effort during WWI.

  

Conclusions

WWI summed up the period of European Modernity and caused irreversible consequences for life in most world societies. The arms race of late 19th century and military modernization were the main reasons why populations have been recognized as very important resource. During this period, the foreign and internal policies of most European states had become more coordinated and closely associated, influencing the emergence of organized population movements as an important strategy in WWI.
The example of Galicia demonstrates the similarity in the main approaches of both the Habsburg and Romanov regimes to huge masses of populations as a resource during the war. There were few differences in techniques and means of displacement policy: mobilization, evacuation of friendly refugees, internment of suspects and their isolation in camps or interior. Thus, organized displacement became one of the victory strategies important to military operations. WWI demonstrated that the displacement of thousands of people could be an effective politic method on a local and international level, and became categorized as a widely-used strategy.
For the territory of Galicia its borderland status created serious problems: the heterogeneous society was divided by imperial regimes into supporters and victims.  Almost every man of a productive age changed his place of residence during the war. In this situation the local population became nothing less than a puppet of state-led violence by two great empires, sacrificed to the aim of victory in the WWI. In this instance, WWI demonstrated how the means had diversified during the age of Modernity: mass displacement, mobilization to mass armies, concentration camps were the inventions of this epoch, provided by technological progress of 19th century. Since then such natural phenomenon as population movement has become a means of state-led policy. Thus, WWI could be recognized as a model of population movement in the time of Late European Modernity.

 

NOTE:

Nota 1 A. Brusatti (Hrsg.), Die Habsburgermonarchie, Bd. 1., Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1973, pp. 18-19; J. Feichtinger, Habsburg (Post)-Colonial: Anmerkungen zur Inneren Kolonisierung in Zentraleuropa, in «Kakanien revisited»: http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/theorie/JFeichtinger1.pdf v. 25.01.2001.; A. C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: the Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2000, pp. 15-16.; R. Koessler, Auf dem Weg zu einer kritischen Theorie der Modernisierung, s.n., Frankfurt 1996, pp. 13-20. Torna al testo

Nota 2 For Austria-Hungary it was fast industrial development of so-called Alpenländer (modern Austria and Slovenia) and Bohemia and following existence of agrarian economy in Galicia, Bosnia and the most of Hungarian territories. A. Brusatti (Hrsg.), Die Habsburgermonarchie, cit., pp. 148-149. Torna al testo

Nota 3 Further reading on the modernization in East Central Europe: T. Berend, G. Ranki, The East Central European variant of the industrial revolution, in War and society in East Central Europe, vol. XIX, East Central European society in the First World War, Columbia Press, New York 1985, pp. 43-87; Ch. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990. Torna al testo

Nota 4 T. Berend, G. Ranki, The East Central European variant of the industrial revolution, pp. 43-87; F. Chambers, The war behind the war: 1914-1918. A history of the political and civilian fronts, s.n., London 1939; N. Dreisziger, The dimensions of total war in East Central Europe 1914-1918, in War and society in East Central Europe, vol. XIX, cit., pp. 3-27; Г. Шигалин, Военная экономика в первую мировую войну (1914-1918), Военное издательство, Москва 1956. Torna al testo

Nota 5 F. Franek, Probleme der Organisation im Ersten Weltkrieg, in «Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen», 1930, p. 980; H. Haselsteiner, The Habsburg empire in the First World War: mobilization of food supplies, in War and society in East Central Europe, vol. XIX, cit., pp. 87-103; Л. Гаврилов, В. Кутузов, Истощение людских резервов русской армии в 1917 г., in Первая мировая война: 1914-1918,Наука, Москва 1968, p. 145-158; Е. Сенявская, Психология войны в ХХ веке: исторический опыт России, РОССПЭН, Москва 1999, p. 45. Torna al testo

Nota 6 J.-P. Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century, Macmillan Press Ltd., Edmonton 1988; T. Kargol, Wirtschaftliche Beziehungen zwischen Galizien und den Ländern der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, in C. Augustznowicz, A. Kappeler (Hrsg.), Die Galizische Grenze 1772-1867: Kommunikation oder Isolation?, Europa orientalis, Bd. 4, Lit Verlag, Wien-Berlin 2007, pp. 33-51; A. Komlosy, State, Regions and Borders: Single Market Formation and Labor Migration in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1750-1918, in «Fernand Braudel Center», 27 (2004), pp. 135-178. Torna al testo

Nota 7 Following books could be recommended for further reading in this well-studied field: Galicia as unique microcosm in East Central Europe: O. Bartov, E. D. Weitz, Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands, Indiana University Press, Indiana 2012, pp. 8-9; “constructing” of Galicia and its political life: L. Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2010, especially pp. 1-7; H. Binder, Galizien in Wien. Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im Übergang zur Massenpolitik, Studien zur Geschichte der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie, 29, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 2005; A. Dziadzio, Die Kroatische und Galizische Autonomie: Rechtshistorischer und politologischer Aspekt. Zur Stellung der Rechtsgeschichte in der Erforschungen der Verfassungsgeschichte, in K. Kovács, Zu den gegenwaertigen rechtsgeschichtlichen Forschungen, ELTE, Budapest 1987, pp. 25-41; А. Дж. П. Тейлор, Габсбурзька монархія 1809-1918, ВНТП-Класика, Львів 2002 (or. ed. A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918, Hamish Hamilton, London 1941), pp. 67-72. Torna al testo

Nota 8 A. V. Prusin, The lands between: conflict in the East European borderlands, 1870-1992, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2010, pp. 12-35; B. Kuzmany, Der Galizische Ausgleich als Beispiel moderner Nationalitätenpolitik?, in E. Haid, S. Weismann, B. Wöller (Hrsg.), Galizien: Peripherie der Moderne – Moderne der Peripherie?, Tagungen zur Ostmitteleuropaforschung, 31, Hrsg. vom Herder-Institut für historische Ostmitteleuropaforschung – Institut der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft Verlag Herder-Institut, Marburg 2013, pp. 123-144; І. Монолатій, Інші свої: політична участь етнічних акторів пізньогабсбурзьких Галичини і Буковини, Лілея-НВ, Івано-Франківськ 2012, pp. 200-209, 316-318, 329. Torna al testo

Nota 9 Rosya “oswobodzicielka” w Galicyi, PON, Piotrkow 1914, p. 5.; F. Schupp, Die Bedeutung der Ukraine für den Weltkrieg, in «Osteuropaeische Zukunft», 20 (1917), pp. 289-290; Б. Андрусишин, Україна в роки першої світової війни, in Перша світова війна і слов'янські народи: Матеріали міжнарод. наук. конф., s.n., Київ 1998, p. 18; Отчетъ Львовскаго губернатора […], s.n., Киев 1916, p. 9; А. Погодинъ, Славянскій міръ: политическое и экономическое положеніе славянскихъ народовъ передъ войной 1914 года, Типографія И. Д. Сытина, Москва 1915. Torna al testo

Nota 10 Austriacus, Polnische Russophilen und Masseverhaftungen staatstreuer Ukrainer in Galizien, Carl Kroll, Berlin 1915, pp. 1-15. Torna al testo

Nota 11 Pitreich von H., Meine Beziehungen zu den Armeeforderungen Ungarns verbunden mit der Betrachtung darmaliger internationaler Situation, s. n., Wien 1911, pp. 2-3, 18; G. Stourzh, Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good Intentions, Evil Consequences, in The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective, University press, Edinburgh 1994, pp. 67-89; Id., The Multinational Empire Revisited: Reflections on Late Imperial Austria, in «Austrian history yearbook», vol. XXIII (1992), pp. 1-23; А. Дж. П. Тейлор, Габсбурзька монархія, cit., p. 219. Torna al testo

Nota 12 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Jahr 1881, XI Heft: Heer, Kriegsmarine, K. K. Statistische Zentral-Commission, Wien 1882, pp. 10-11.; Вооруженныя силы Австро-Венгріи, Ч. І: Организація, мобилизація и составъ вооруженныхъ силъ. По даннымъ къ 1 января 1912 года, Военная Типографія, Санкт-Петербургъ 1912, pp. 2-17.; Г. Шигалин, Военная экономика в первую мировую войну, cit., pp. 35, 50. Torna al testo

Nota 13 Kriegsarchiv, Wien (KA), Chef des Ersatzwesens für die gesamte Bewaffnete Macht, Aktenkartons (ChdE), 2-1/4, p. 2. Torna al testo

Nota 14 W. Kutschabsky, Die Westukraine im Kampfe mit polen und dem Bolschewismus in den Jahren 1918-1923, Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, Berlin 1934, pp. 233-239; KA, ChdE-127. Torna al testo

Nota 15 Г. Шигалин, Военная экономика в первую мировую войну, cit., pp. 55, 248. Torna al testo

Nota 16 M. Krotofil, UkrainskaArmiaHalicka 1918-1920: Organizacja, uzbrojenie, wyposazenieIwartoscbojowasił zbrojnychZachodnio-UkrainskiejRepublikiLudowej, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszłek, Torun 2003, p. 30; ÖsterreichischeStatistik: NeueFolge, Bd. 1, X Abschnitt, DieZivilbevolkerungunddasactiveMilitär, K.K. Statistischen Zentralkommission, Wien 1910; W. Winkler, DieTotenverlustederOesterreich-UngarischeMonarchienachNationalitaeten: dieAltersgliederungderToten. AusblickeindieZukunft, Verlag von L. W. Seidl & Sohu, Wien 1919, pp. 3-8. Torna al testo

Nota 17 The Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv (CDIAL), fond 146 (The Galician Vice-Regency), opys 4, file 3364, pp. 31-46; ZarzadzeniawyjatkowewGalicyinawypadekwojny: Wkazowkidlac. kStarostwiDyrekcyiPolicyicodoprzygotowaniaiwprowadzeniawzycietychzarzadzen, s.n., Lwow 1909, pp. 1-66. Torna al testo

Nota 18 CDIAL, fond 146, opys 4, file 3366, p. 54; KA, Kriegsministerium, Präsidial-Büro, Sonderreihe (KM), Karton #2863, pp. 3-6; K. Schoeller, Das Mobwesen Oesterreich-Ungarns 1914, s.n., Salzburg 1966, pp. 29-33. Torna al testo

Nota 19 A. V. Wendland, Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische konservative zwischen Oesterreich und Russland, 1848-1915, Studien zur Geschichte der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, vol. 27, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 2001, pp. 540-550; І. Карбулицький,Моїспомини (уривокпрожандарськийтерорв 1914-1918 pp.), inО. Доброжанський, В. Старик, Бажаємо до України: змагання за українську державність на Буковині у спогадах очевидців (1914-1921 pp.), Маяк, Одеса 2008, p. 638; І. Карпинець, Галичина: військова історія 1914-1921 рр., Панорама, Львів 2005, p. 63; Талергофскийальманахъ. Пропамятная книга австрийских жестокостей, изуверств и насилій над карпато-русскимъ народом во время всемірной войны 1914-1917 гг. Вып. 1, Талергофскій комитет, Львов 1924, p. 5; М. Цеглинський, Галицькі погроми: трагічна сторінка з життя галицьких Українців в часи европейської війни 1914-1915 рр., Робітник, Клівленд 1917, pp. 2-17. Torna al testo

Nota 20 There were simultaneous processes of mass hysteria, directed to “enemy aliens” or traitor suspects, in the most of European states of the time, like the rise of anti-Semitism in Russia. P. Gatrell, A whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during the World War I, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1999, p. 17; Б. Андрусишин, Україна в роки першої світової війни, cit., c. 22; Талергофскийальманах, cit., Вып. 2, pp. 109-133. Torna al testo

Nota 21 В. Бурдяк, Становище галицьких українців на початку першої світової війни: соціологічний ракурс, in Перша світова війна. Історичні долі народів Центральної та Східної Європи: Матеріали міжнарод. наук. конф., s.n., Чернівці 2000, pp. 286-289; В. Заполовський, Буковина в останній війні Австро-Угорщини, Золоті литаври, Чернівці 2003, pp. 43, 190-194; М. Корнилович, Плани „возсоєдіненія галицьких уніатів” в 1914-1915, in «Україна», 3 (1925), pp. 145-152. Torna al testo

Nota 22 CDIAL, fond 146, opys 4, file 3366, pp. 63-64, 66; KA, KM, Karton #2863., pp. 8-9, 13-16, Anhang 1-d. Torna al testo

Nota 23 В. Бурдяк, Становище галицьких українців на початку першої світової війни, cit., pp. 280-292. Torna al testo

Nota 24 B. Holter, DieOstjudischeKriegsflüchtlingeinWien 1914-1923, s.n., Salzburg 1978, pp. 12-15; В. Заполовський, Буковина в останній війні Австро-Угорщини, cit., p. 43; Е. Рубинштейн, Крушение Австро-Венгерской монархии, Изд-во Академии наук, Москва 1963, p. 88; І. Семака, Про виселенців; Id. Житє і доля виселенців на Моравії, inО. Доброжанський, В. Старик, Бажаємо до України, cit., pp. 652-654. Torna al testo

Nota 25 R. Lein, “Sterb’ ich in Polen...“ Strategische und taktische Vorbedingungen der Kriegsführung an der österreichisch-ungarischen Nordostfront 1914, in M. Wakounig, W. Mueller, M. Portmann, Nation, Nationalitäten und Nationalismus im östlichen Europa, LIT Verlag, Wien-Münster 2010, pp. 387-388; I. Materniak, Przemysl 1914-1915, Altair, Warszawa 1994; Завоевание восточной Галиціи, s.n., Москва 1914; І. Карпинець, Галичина: військова історія 1914-1921 рр., cit., pp. 54-60. Torna al testo

Nota 26 The Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv (CDIAK), fond 361 (The Chancellery of The Military General-Governorship of Galicia), opys 1, file 79a, 1914, pp. 1-48; Отчетъ канцелярій военнаго генерал-губернатора Галиціи […], s.n., Киев 1916, с. 7, 17; Отчетъ Львовскаго [...], cit., p. 1. Torna al testo

Nota 27 Chlamtacz, LembergspolitischePhysiognomiewährendderRussischenInvasion 3/IX/1914 – 22/VI/1915, R. Lechner, Wien 1916, pp. 10-12, 44-46, 75-95; J.-P. Himka, GalicianVillagersandtheUkrainianNationalMovementintheNineteenthCentury, cit., pp. 483-492; Rosya “oswobodzicielka” wGalicyi, cit., p. 15; Отчетъ по Львовскому градоначальству […], s.n., Киев 1916, pp. 5-12, 19; І. Петрович (І. Крип’якевич), Галичина під час Російської окупації серпень 1914 – червень 1915, Політична Бібліотека, Львів 1915, pp. 14-18, 25, 54-7, 81, 95. Torna al testo

Nota 28 CDIAK, fond 1439 (Chernihiv province Gendarme Direction), opys 1, file 1602, 1914, pp. 7, 10, 15, 109, 111. According to the research of Peter Gatrell, not less than 200,000 Germans who lived in Russia were displaced due to such regulations: P. Gatrell, A whole Empire Walking, cit., p. 23. Torna al testo

Nota 29 В. Маковський, Талєргоф: спогади і документи, Діло, Львів 1934, pp. 1-50; Similar regulations were valid in other European countries: Д. Дорошенко, Мої спомини про недавнє минуле: 1914-1920, Темпора, Київ 2007 (I ed. Львів 1923). Torna al testo

Nota 30 P. Gatrell, A whole Empire Walking, cit., pp. 16-17. Torna al testo

Nota 31 CDIAK, fond 301 (Podolia province Gendarme Direction), opys 1, file 3310, 1914, p. 3. Torna al testo

Nota 32 Chlamtacz, Lembergspolitische Physiognomie, cit., p. 109; Отчетъ временнаго военнаго генералъ-губернатора Галиціи по управленію краемъ за время съ 1 сентября 1914 года по 1 іюля 1915 года, s.n., Киев 1916, p. 17; Отчетъ канцелярій [...], cit., pp. 31-32, 43; Отчетъ по Львовскому [...], cit., pp. 5-12, 19. Torna al testo

Nota 33 J. Chlodecki, Zakladnicy miasta Lwowa w niewoli rosyjskiej 1915-1918, s.n., Lwow 1930, pp. 1, 9. Torna al testo

Nota 34 Ibid., pp. 1, 23, 42, 100-103; Отчетъ временнаго [...], cit., p. 17; Отчетъ канцелярій [...],cit., p. 34. Torna al testo

Nota 35 The Central State Archive of Supreme Governing Bodies of Ukraine, fond 1792 (The Podolia province Comissar of the Provisional Government), opys 1, file 23, 1917, p. 341; E. Prus, WladykaSwietojurski. Rzecz o arcybiskupie Andrzeju Szeptyckim 1865-1944, Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, Warszawa 1985, pp. 49-56. Torna al testo

Nota 36 CDIAK, fond 363 (The Headquarters of The Military General-Governorship of Galicia), opys 1, file 77, 1915, pp. 1, 27, 99, 305; fond 1439, opys 1, file 1602, pp. 11, 46, 126, 133, 137; R. Nachtigal, Russland und seine Oesterreich-Ungarische kriegsgefangenen, Verlag Albert Greiner, Remshalden 2003, pp. 58-59. Torna al testo

Nota 37 CDIAK, fond 363, opys 1, file 23, 1914, pp. 7, 12, 14, 129-130, 154, 160, 381. Torna al testo

Nota 38 CDIAK, fond 361, opys 1, file 224, 1914-1915, pp. 95, 119; fond 363, opys 1, file 77, p. 305; opys 3, file 15, 1914, pp. 1-127; Отчетъ временнаго [...], cit., p. 14. Torna al testo

Nota 39 Краткій отчетъ по управленію Черновецкой губерніей за періодъ времени съ 1 сентября по 7 октября 1914 г. и съ 17 ноября 1914 г. по 1 февраля 1915 г. б. Черновецкаго губернатора камеръ-юнкера двора Его Императорскаго величества Евреинова[…], s.n., Киев 1916, p. 6. Torna al testo

Nota 40 CDIAK, fond 361, opys 1, file 478, 1915; opys 2, file 11, 1915-1916, pp. 5, 22, 45, 94-112; J. Chlodecki, Zakladnicy, cit., p. 1; Д. Дорошенко, Мої спомини про недавнє минуле: 1914-1920, cit., pp. 51, 95. Torna al testo

Nota 41 J. Chlodecki, Zakladnicy, cit., p. 1. Torna al testo

Nota 42 В. Любченко, Нереалізований проект створення на Південному Кавказі „Галицького козацтва” як один із способів розв’язання проблеми біженців, in «Проблеми історії України ХІХ – початку ХХ століть», 4 (2002), pp. 45-51. Torna al testo

Nota 43 CDIAK, fond 361, opys 1, file 481, 1915, p. 9; file 552, 1915-1917, pp. 1-23, 56-57, 76; Chlamtacz, Lembergspolitische Physiognomie, cit., p. 115. Torna al testo

Nota 44 А. Бахтурина, Политика Российской империи в Восточной Галиции в годы Первой мировой войны, Аиро-ХХ, Москва 2000, pp. 187-188; Отчетъ временнаго [...], cit., p. 46; Отчетъ канцелярій [...], cit., pp. 2, 20, 53; Отчетъ по Львовскому [...], cit., p. 17; Цеглинський, Галицькі погроми: трагічна сторінка з життя галицьких Українців в часи европейської війни 1914-1915 рр., cit., pp. 1-17. There is also alternative data, indicating that the general sum of refugees from Galicia was several times higher; Peter Gatrell indicates not less than 400,000 refugees from Galicia only during 1915: P. Gatrell, A whole Empire Walking, cit., p. 21. Torna al testo

Nota 45 CDIAK fond 361, opys 1, file 302, 1915, pp. 60-71; В. Ваврикъ Карпатороссы в корниловскомъ походе и добровольческой арміи, Ставропигійскій институт, Львов 1923. Torna al testo

Nota 46 CDIAK fond 361, opys 1, file 302, pp. 60-71; H. Leidner, V. Moritz, In russischer Gefangenschaft: Erlebnisse österreichischer Soldaten im Erster Weltkrieg, Böhlau Verlag, Wien-Köln-Weimar 2008, p. 273. Torna al testo

 

 

Questo saggio si cita: S. Choliy, War as a Model of Population Movement in the MOdern World: the Galician Perspectives in the First World War, in «Percorsi Storici», 2 (2014)

 

 

 

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